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PROFESSOR BOWMAN: Good morning and welcome, everyone. My name is Locke 
Bowman. I am the director of the MacArthur Justice Center and a professor here at the law 
school. And I'm pleased and honored to welcome you all to a day of conversation about 
what works; about how litigation, grass roots activism, and policy reform are making a 
difference in combatting our unacceptable level of police-on-citizen violence. That is the 
reality that motivates this conference. And that is the starting point for our discussion today. 
We doubt that anyone disputes this. Indeed, what is most remarkable about the 
aftermath of Michael Brown's shooting a year ago last August is not the avalanche of 
commentary and protest in the streets. It is not the glare of media attention, nor is it the 
sustained salience of that attention. 
What is most remarkable is that this great outpouring arose from something so 
senseless, and yet, so ordinary: a young African-American man killed in an encounter with 
law enforcement. 
The government cannot tell us how frequently police kill citizens, but we know 
enough to know that the killing of a young black man on the streets of this country is an 
everyday occurrence. 
According to the Guardian's "The Counted" Project, there have been nearly a 
thousand citizen fatalities at the hands of police in the first ten and a half months of this 
year. 
Those most at risk are African-Americans, whose fatality rate, adjusted for their 
share of the population, is three times that of whites and other races. Police have been 
charged with crimes of any kind in less than 1% of these fatal encounters. Rates of police 
discipline for these homicides aren't known, but I will wager that they are even lower. 
And, of course, police homicides are but the tip of an iceberg that includes tens of 
thousands of arrests, more violent than necessary; countless discretionary so-called 
investigative stops of motorists, mainly black and brown, for trivial or nonexistent 
infractions; the daily racism and indignities of stop and frisk; the unjustified so-called mob 




Our conversation today will be about what we can do to mitigate the racial bias that 
contributes to this misconduct and what we can do to make police accountable when they 
victimize citizens. 
It is fitting that we should begin our discussion today with a talk about why why 
African-Americans are so disproportionately the victims of police violence. 
Destiny Peery frames the issue this way: What are the psychological mechanisms, 
including unacknowledged bias and threats produced by stereotyping, that interact with 
police training, the social context of policing, and existing policies and procedures to foster 
abuses of authority, the use of violence and sour relationships between police and their 
communities? 
Destiny is the perfect person to tackle this question. She is a J.D. She is also a Ph.D., 
both from Northwestern. She holds a joint appointment in this law school and in our 
University's Department of Psychology. Destiny has written and published extensively 
about race, people's perception of race, and the effects of those perceptions. 
Among many other projects, she is one of the authors of a prominent and much-cited 
study about the way we read mixed-race individuals. Are they biracial, or are they black? 
Destiny is a popular teacher here. She is a sought-after lecturer. She is lucid and 
smart. And I, for one, am very much looking forward to her talk. 
Please join me in welcoming Destiny Peery. 
 
PROFESSOR PEERY: That was a very kind introduction. 
I'm here to provide a foundation for thinking about bias in policing from a 
psychological standpoint. The starting point for me, as a lawyer, a law professor, and a 
psychologist, is: what is bias? What are the underlying mechanisms that inform not only 
policing, but also, more generally, how we interact with and perceive others in the world 
around us? 
Of course, where we're starting in the context of this symposium—and it’s already 
been referenced multiple times in this setting—is the Ferguson spotlight. We have a 
situation in Ferguson, with the killing of Michael Brown, that brings to nationwide 
attention the idea of bias in policing, including its effects on criminal justice disparities 
more broadly—things like mass incarceration, disparate impact of arrests, and disparate 
suspicion trained on certain types of individuals over others. What can we do about this? 
Is this about implicit bias? Is this about explicit bias? Do we address it through training? 
Do we address it through some other means? And that's part of the foundation for this type 
of symposium, but also a foundation for what is now a national discourse on bias in 
policing. 
I want to highlight that none of these issues are new. Questions about implicit bias, 
explicit bias, the impact of bias on how we perceive and react to other people: they’re not 
new. They didn’t first appear when we saw Michael Brown lying in the street that hot 
August afternoon. The idea of implicit bias in psychology has been around for decades. 
And certainly explicit bias, or prejudice, and discrimination have been around for probably 
as long as humans have been around. But current events give us a specific context in which 
to focus on the role of bias in our interactions in society, and in particular, given our setting 
here in a law school, the effect of bias on the legal system. 
Underlying our understanding of current events—and this is why I'm starting the 
symposium off here—is the psychology of bias. Once we abstract from a particular context, 
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we can focus on what's going on in our brains—what’s going on in our minds—when we 
stereotype another person, think another person is less than, or treat another person in a 
way that’s dehumanizing or that in some way harms them. 
I usually start off this introduction with a discussion of the triad of stereotyping, 
prejudice, and discrimination, because we tend to hear those three things talked about 
together. From a psychological standpoint, they are separate but related concepts that can 
have different consequences for our interactions with other people. 
We tend to hear the most, day to day, about stereotypes, and stereotyping is in some 
ways the most concrete concept of the three. Stereotypes are beliefs about certain groups 
or types of people having certain attributes. For example, thinking that black people are 
good at sports, Asian people are good at math, women are caring, men are aggressive; those 
are all stereotypes. They’re ideas that we attach to groups. A stereotype isn’t about whether 
any one man, woman, black person, Asian person, et cetera has this this or that trait. 
Instead, a stereotype takes it as given that by virtue of being a member of a group, you have 
a certain characteristic or trait. 
Stereotypes can be both descriptive, meaning they focus on what certain types of 
people are like, and prescriptive, meaning they focus on what people of a certain group 
should be like. For example, in the sex or gender context, we often encounter the 
expectation that women will be caring, will be nurturing. Violations of that stereotype are 
problematic. We also encounter expectations that black people will be violent, that they 
will be criminals, that they will be aggressive. And violations of those “negative” 
stereotypes can also cause problems just as violations of “positive” stereotypes can cause 
problems. 
Prejudice, unlike stereotyping, is not concrete—at least, not in the sense that it can 
be attached to a particular idea, a particular belief or characteristic. It's more of a 
generalized, affective emotional response to a group. It refers to the reaction that we have, 
maybe the unease that we have, when we encounter people from groups that we're not 
familiar with. So when you're walking down the street, and you encounter somebody from 
a group that you’re not familiar with, maybe you think, "Eh, I'm not quite comfortable with 
this person." You can't necessarily articulate why that’s the case, and what the term 
“prejudice” is capturing is your inarticuable emotional response. Which is why I say that 
prejudice is diffuse. It's usually positive or negative in a general sense, but it's not 
something you can express in the form of, "I feel this way because I believe this about this 
person." It's just comfort or discomfort, positivity or negativity, toward social groups. 
Discrimination refers to our propensity to treat some groups differently than we treat 
others. In a way, it’s actually the behavioral response to—or behavioral manifestation of—
prejudice or bias. But discrimination can also exist in the absence of prejudice or bias; all 
you need is a system that’s set up to treat certain types of people differently than other 
types of people. 
Discrimination, like prejudice, can be diffuse, can be vague. We obviously accept 
that treating certain people, or certain types of people, differently than others is ok in some 
circumstances. How do we decide when it’s ok and when it’s not? What crosses the line? 
The point for the moment isn’t to answer that question, but just to note that discrimination 
has fuzzy boundaries, and any kind of differential treatment, any kind of behavioral 
response to a certain type of person, could in some sense be considered discrimination.   
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So having sketched those three concepts—stereotyping, prejudice, and 
discrimination—I want to start talking about implicit bias, which we hear about a lot in the 
post-Ferguson context. In particular, we hear a lot about how the answer to everything 
that's going on in the world of policing at the moment is giving police officers implicit bias 
training. I’m going to give an overview of implicit bias, including how it fits into our lives 
in general and how it’s relevant to police training. 
Implicit bias emerges from the idea that in terms of the way that we process 
information, we have two systems at work in our minds. One system operates relatively 
automatically, and that’s the system where implicit bias originates. We also have a system 
that operates relatively deliberately, and that’s the one where explicit bias originates. 
Obviously, these systems are working all the time, and the picture of how they interact is 
complex. But the bottom line is that when you have some kind of dilemma or question, 
maybe just a response to a social scenario—it could be any number of things—you have to 
process information in order to decide how you’re going to behave. And if there is no 
reason for you to pay special attention to specific things involving the dilemma or social 
scenario, then you’re going to engage in what’s called automatic processing. 
For example, when I go out onto Michigan Avenue and I see the rush of people 
coming at me, there is no reason for me to invest time or resources or to be motivated to 
process each of those individuals as individuals. Instead, I’ll process them in a more 
generic way, like: “That's a black person.” “That’s a white person.” “That’s a woman.” 
“That’s a man.” And what will automatically be activated in the course of that processing 
are ideas or associations that go along with those group memberships. What I won’t be 
doing is finding out anything particular about any individual, or thinking about one person 
as somehow different from any other person who fits that social category. 
Thus, when it comes to implicit bias, what we're suggesting is that it's a type of bias 
that runs through our automatic mental-processing system. It's a type of bias that does not 
require that we be motivated to think or behave in a certain way. We can experience and 
be affected by implicit bias without being aware that it’s happening. And it's not something 
that happens because we want it to happen, in most cases. It's just there, and it's operating 
under the surface all the time. 
In contrast to that, the deliberate system is where we find our kind of spoken—or at 
least articulable—beliefs and attitudes about various ideas. But that system requires 
motivation and cognitive resources and time and deliberation. When we look at how often 
in our day-to-day lives we're engaged in that conscious, motivated, deliberate processing, 
it's not very much, considering the amount of social stimuli we face in the world. Most of 
the things we respond to, even on the way to and from work, we don't have to think about 
consciously. We just do it. The deliberate system doesn’t actually account for a lot of our 
minute-by-minute information-processing. It wouldn’t be practical. We have to process so 
much information that the only way we can do it is if we mostly use our automatic 
cognition. 
So the distinction between implicit and explicit bias comes from this dual model of 
cognition. And one of the things that makes implicit bias such a challenge is that it’s 
happening beneath the surface, without our conscious recognition, and it requires effort to 
even be aware of it—which means it requires us to devote extra resources to monitoring 
our own information-processing. That doesn’t usually come naturally to us, and it means 
we can’t study or respond to implicit bias in the way we study and respond to explicit bias. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY        [2017 
 
 358
Again, explicit attitudes are the ones that we have heard of for a long time and that 
we feel like we have a much better grasp on. They’re the attitudes we consciously, 
deliberately endorse. People will often—possibly for reasons of social expediency—
choose not report them, but they're able to report them. If I ask you about your racial 
attitudes about a particular group, you can report what those attitudes are on a survey, for 
example, or on some kind of psychological measurement. If I'm doing it in that way, I'm 
capturing your explicit attitudes about that group. They’re going to be your deliberate 
attitudes, things that you have, in theory, consciously decided: “I think this way about 
men.” “I think this way about women.” “I think this way about black people.” “I think this 
way about white people.” Whereas implicit attitudes are subtle and non-conscious. Usually, 
people can’t self-report implicit attitudes. As a result, you have to develop some other kind 
of tool to measure implicit attitudes. 
The other thing that's important about implicit attitudes is that they can be influenced 
by a number of different variables. They're certainly linked to our ideas that come out of 
our explicit attitudes, so they're linked to those consciously endorsed beliefs, but they may 
not always line up perfectly with those consciously endorsed beliefs. For example, I may 
have very strong, explicit, egalitarian attitudes or values, but I may also, when given an 
implicit measure or task, register some kind of bias towards certain social groups. That is 
not uncommon. And certainly, that's the context in which we're working, a world in which 
there is a lot of explicit endorsement of egalitarian values, of the value of diversity, of all 
these things that would suggest that we're in a post-racial society. But work on implicit bias 
suggests that we're not, largely because of that divergence that we often see between the 
explicit level and the implicit level. 
Implicit attitudes, rather than being measured by self-report—by you filling out a 
survey or filling out a questionnaire that asks about your attitudes—are measured using 
other means, the most common of which is the Implicit-Association Test, or IAT. The idea 
is that in order to capture relatively automatic, spontaneous, less controllable attitudes, we 
need to use a different type of measure. We can't just ask people what they think. 
I'm going to have you in just a moment go through an exercise that demonstrates 
what this looks like. But first, I want to point out that explicit and implicit attitudes don’t 
just diverge: they also converge. Sometimes, they line up with one another. If you ask 
people about, for example, their views on various presidential candidates, if you ask them 
what their explicit attitudes are by giving them a questionnaire, they're going to tell you 
that. If you give them an implicit measure on the same topics, it will probably line up. If 
you ask them what they feel about a number of attitude-objects, for example, preferences 
for food or soda brands or something like that, you tend to get convergence between the 
explicit and the implicit. 
Where you get a lot of divergences between the two is on controversial or sensitive 
topics, like views on sex or gender, or views on race. This divergence matters because 
explicit and implicit attitudes predict different things. So if we're looking at the relationship 
between an attitude and a behavior, an explicit attitude is going to predict more deliberate, 
more consciously decided behaviors. If I'm trying to behave in a way that is not 
discriminatory, my explicit attitudes are going to do a better job of predicting that. For 
example, if I’m trying to review a set of job applications and not take into account the race 
that the names on those applications suggest, my explicit attitudes are going to do a pretty 
good job of predicting the likelihood that I will not engage in discrimination in that setting. 
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Implicit attitudes, on the other hand, predict less controllable or more ambiguous or 
subtle responses, so they predict, for example, non-verbal interactions or non-verbal 
communication. How likely am I to sit next to a black person on the bus? How close am I 
willing to be to people from different groups that I'm not familiar with? Those are things 
that we don't necessarily consciously decide. They're kind of related to this idea that we 
feel these general levels of discomfort or comfort in relation to certain people. And that's 
more closely tied to implicit attitudes than to explicit attitudes. 
Going back to the resume example, if I have no conscious goal not to be 
discriminatory, if I'm reviewing two resumes or applications with names that suggest one 
white applicant and one black applicant and I don't have a conscious desire to not 
discriminate, that's when implicit bias can play a role. I may be drawn to the white 
candidate over the black candidate because they just seem like they're a better fit. I can't 
articulate exactly why that's the case, but I'm drawn to that person in some way. 
It's not so much that explicit and implicit attitudes always produce different 
responses, but that the way that you get to the responses may different depending on 
whether you're taking the explicit route or the implicit route. Consequently, the way that 
you address problems has to be different, depending on whether you're going after the 
explicit or the implicit. 
And I’ll say that in the context of bias in policing, we're certainly not in a world 
where the only type of bias we're concerned about or should be concerned about is implicit; 
there are certainly lots of explicit biases at play alongside implicit biases. You hear a lot of 
discussion about implicit bias in policing, and implicit bias training as being the solution 
to the problems that we see, but we have just as many problems in society and policing 
generally that have to do with explicit biases. In fact, post-Obama, rather than seeing a 
post-racial world, we see an increase in expressions of explicit bias. We see an increase in 
the kind of blatant, overt discriminatory or prejudicial behaviors that we had hoped were 
long gone, or at least going away, in our society. 
So it’s not that implicit bias is the only thing we have to be concerned with, it’s more 
that even measuring it and bringing it into the open poses challenges that we’re working 
on surmounting. As I mentioned, the main measurement of implicit bias is the Implicit 
Association Test, the IAT. This is an evaluative test that's meant to measure the general 
positivity or negativity that you feel toward certain social groups or attitude objects. It can 
measure any implicit bias or association, not just those associated with race. People often 
think of it as being closely connected to measuring racial bias, but you can use the IAT to 
measure people's preferences for Coke versus Pepsi, for certain presidential candidates; 
certainly, other social categories beyond race. 
One thing to know is that it's not considered, at least by researchers, to be individually 
diagnostic, which means it's not a test or measurement that you can administer and then 
label somebody as being racist or not racist, biased or not biased. The information that it 
gives us is useful in the aggregate. It’s information that enables us to see, generally, that 
people move in one direction or another on these results. It can tell us about how people 
tend to think, not necessarily how any one individual thinks. There’s some dispute about 
this with regard to the difference between what researchers get out of IAT results and what 
laypeople get out of IAT results. In practice, most people want to be able to have an 
individually diagnostic tool, and that can lead to a discrepancy in how laypeople and 
researchers view the IAT. This is compounded or amplified by the fact that the test is 
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administered on an individual basis. So it's easy to see ways in which we’d assume it was 
individually diagnostic. But researchers caution against using it for those reasons. 
I wanted to bring up those points because what I'm going to do now is actually give 
you an opportunity to go through a modified version of an IAT. And I assume that at least 
some people in the room have already done one of these, so bear with me. But for those of 
you who may not be familiar, this will give you a general sense of how implicit tasks tend 
to operate. After this, I'll talk a little bit about other variations of the task that apply 
specifically to situations that are invoked by the topic of today's symposium: implicit bias 
in policing. 
So you're going to complete a task in which you will sort words and pictures into 
categories as quickly as possible. All you have to decide is whether a particular word is 
positive or negative, or whether a face that you see is a black face or a white face. 
Here are some examples of the words that you’ll see. Positive words include things 
like joy, love, peace, et cetera. Negative words include things like agony, terrible, horrible. 
So it will be clear—it should be clear—which are the good words and which are the bad 
words. You’ll also see faces of black people or white people. Again, it should be clear 
whether the face is a black face or a white face. 
Now I need you to take things out of your laps. And I need you to put one hand on 
your left thigh, and one hand on your right thigh. 
What you're going to see in a moment is two labels at the top of the screen. And those 
labels are going to indicate whether you slap your left thigh or your right thigh. Remember, 
all you're doing is categorizing. All you're doing is deciding, Is this a black face or a white 
face? Is this a good word or a bad word? 
You want to go as fast as possible. You want to be as accurate as possible. But if you 
make a mistake, it's okay. Don't worry about it. If you do realize that you've made a mistake, 
simply just correct to the other side. So if you realize you accidentally slapped the wrong 
thigh, slap the other thigh before moving on. 
Does everyone feel ready at this point? So everyone is nervous. It's okay. Remember, 
this is not individually diagnostic. 
Here is our first set of categories. You have white American on your left side. You 
have black American on your right side. So one hand on each knee. Faces are going to 
appear. Simply slap whichever thigh corresponds to the face that you see. Be as accurate 
as possible. Do it as quickly as possible, okay? 
Ready? Okay. So we're going to change the categories. So now, you have good on 
one side, bad on one side. And this time, you're going to see those words that we were 
talking about. So you see the word, and you just have to say is this a good word or a bad 
word. If it's a good word, you slap your left thigh. If it's a bad word, you slap your right 
thigh. Okay? 
You got faster that time. I heard that. 
So now, we’re going to pair these two things together. So it's the same side as when 
you did them separately, but you're going to see a mixture of words and faces. If you see a 
white face or a good word, you're going to slap your left thigh. If you see a black face or a 
bad word, you're going to slap your right thigh. So the same words, same faces that you 
were seeing before, same side that you were slapping on before. It's just that we've now 
paired the words and the faces on each side, okay? 
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Now, we're going to flip the sides. So now, you're going to see the same faces again, 
black and white faces. But now, you slap your left side if you see a black face. If you see a 
white face, you slap the right side. So again, the same faces that you were seeing before. 
We're simply switching sides. 
Now we're going to add the good and the bad back in. So slap your left thigh if you 
see a black face or a good word. Slap your right thigh if you see a white face or a bad word. 
I know this is hard. Bear with me. 
So that's the Implicit-Association Test (IAT). And what that test is measuring is how 
strongly you associate blackness with goodness or badness, or whiteness with goodness or 
badness. You can hear the pauses that people have when you pair the counter-stereotypical 
responses. That’s because we have strong associations, not just on the basis of social 
targets, but on the basis of general ideas of blackness and badness, whiteness and goodness, 
which means that when you flip those pairings, it's harder to make those responses. 
What that test illustrates is how much harder it is to make counter-stereotypical pairs 
than it is to make stereotypical pairs. And what you find in these measurements is that 
people generally have trouble with the counter-stereotypical pairs: matching white with 
bad and matching black with good. The idea is that the strength of the association predicts 
whether you're likely to engage in behaviors that are informed by implicit bias, and that 
produce disparities on the basis of implicit bias. 
There is a lot of debate about whether that test, or any tests of this variety, reflect 
personal beliefs or cultural influences, like stereotypes. That debate is ongoing. It's been 
ongoing for basically as long as the IAT and implicit bias has been researched. But it 
doesn't matter, because what we do see consistently is that the strength of those 
associations, the quickness with which you slap the correct knee, can predict a variety of 
behaviors, regardless of whether your responses come from cultural influences or from 
personal attitudes. You can see it in hiring/firing/promotion decisions in the workplace. 
You can see it in comfort, closeness with others, allocations of various resources and 
opportunities, and certainly in reactions that police have to, say, white suspects versus 
black suspects. 
Now I want to mention some additional tasks that aren’t exactly like the IAT but are 
meant to capture the sort of automatic, fast, spontaneous responses that are particularly 
relevant to policing. 
First is the weapons identification task. In the weapons identification task, what you 
have is a presentation of faces. Think of the faces you were just looking at in the Implicit-
Association Test. You have a presentation of a white face or a black face. And in the 
weapons identification task, after you see that white face or black face, you see either a 
weapon or a tool. What the researchers look at is whether the color of the face affects 
identification of the next image as a tool or as a weapon. And what they find is that when 
a black face precedes a weapon, you get faster identification of that weapon. When a black 
face precedes a tool, you get more errors in which that tool is identified as a weapon. 
Second is the sheer bias task, which many of you may have heard of. In the sheer 
bias task, police officers, or study participants who include police officers, are presented 
with scenes containing a potential suspect. Sometimes the suspect is white. Sometimes the 
suspect is black. Sometimes they’re standing, sometimes they’re crouching. The scenes 
include various settings out in the world, some urban, some not. And the person—the 
potential suspect—is holding in one of their hands either an innocuous item, like a cell 
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phone or a soda can, or a weapon. Study participants—again, including police officers—
are asked to decide whether they should shoot this person. The instructions are to shoot 
people who have weapons. And what you find is that, for one thing, police officers do 
significantly better than laypeople at this, because they’ve received some relevant training 
and it actually makes a difference. But you also find that in general, people are faster to 
shoot black men with weapons than they are to shoot white men. If anything, there’s an 
inhibition effect surrounding white suspects with weapons: people are particularly slow to 
shoot them. There are also more errors, in the sense that there are more shootings of black 
men who don't have weapons than white men who don't have weapons. 
These tasks are operating on the same basic principles as the Implicit Association 
Test, but they’re doing it in a way that is much more aligned with policing. 
Additionally, there are other processes at play in the policing context that aren’t 
exactly implicit bias, but are certainly relevant to our discussion. One is dehumanization. 
Dehumanization refers to associating social groups with non-humans, like animals. There 
is research that shows that increased dehumanization predicts greater use of force by police. 
For example, the Goff study I refer to here looks at the use of force against black children. 
Dehumanization can attach to any number of social groups in the policing context—
particularly men of color, but certainly all people of color, people who are convicted of 
crimes more generally. 
Another important threat or bias that might be at play in the policing context is 
stereotype threat. Stereotype threat refers to the idea that fear of reinforcing a negative 
stereotype about your own social group can lead you to underperform in the domain in 
which you’re working. Thus, in the policing context, officers’ fear of being perceived as 
racist can put them under threat, which interferes with their ability to actually behave in a 
non-biased way.  
Similarly, masculinity threat is important in the context of policing. Within police 
culture, a perceived threat to one's masculinity can lead to overcompensation in the form 
of force and violence. This type of overcompensation can even help explain the use of force 
and violence by women and LGBT police officers, because the highly masculine culture 
of policing can make people susceptible to masculinity threat even when they don’t 
necessarily think of masculinity as a big part of their personal identity. 
We’re focusing on policing today, but I want to mention that there are other areas of 
the criminal justice system in which we see the same or similar biases having an effect. 
One example is sentencing. People who look “more black” tend to be sentenced more 
harshly. A more stereotypically black-looking man, like the one on the right, is more likely 
to receive the death penalty than the one on the left. And that's even when you control for 
basically every other important factor that should affect sentencing. 
The steps we’re taking to mitigate and eventually solve these problems include 
increasing awareness (which is why we’re all here today), increasing accountability, 
increasing transparency, and incorporating diverse perspectives in our institutions. And I’ll 
say that when it comes to diversity, it’s not as simple as just hiring diverse people—you 
need to do something with the diversity. Which is true, in some ways, of all of this. 
I'll take questions now. 
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VOICE: Hi. I really appreciated your talk. I had a quick question about the training that 
police receive: is it transparent? Can laypeople or citizens see the training that police get 
and contribute to that training? 
 
PROFESSOR PEERY: We don’t have a lot of specific information about police training. 
And that's in part because training differs by police department. There is no universal 
training for police. One of the big pieces that I know the most about, and which has come 
into use more and more, is simulation training, where you engage with suspects in a virtual 
reality setting. And you have to make those shoot or not-shoot decisions. 
There is some research by Phil Goff into those simulation trainings, and that's part of 
where he came up with the idea of masculinity threat and stereotype threat being relevant 
factors alongside to implicit bias because. For example, he found that in those simulation 
trainings, it wasn't implicit bias that predicted officers’ behavior, it was whether or not they 
were a little worried that someone would perceive them as not being masculine enough, or 
worried that someone would perceive them as being racist. 
That’s simulation training. Police go through lots of other forms of training, and we 
don’t know a whole lot of specifics when it comes to those other forms. 
 
VOICE: Hi. Thank you for your presentation. My colleague and I are federal defenders, 
and so we're wondering: what are some of the ways in which you've seen these kinds of 
concepts implemented at the podium, for example, in a criminal case? How can we talk 
about implicit bias and stereotype threat with judges? 
 
PROFESSOR PEERY: It’s certainly hard see how you get this information into the 
courtroom, and it might be more promising to think about keeping individual judges 
informed of these ideas in general. Judges go through a lot of training, and I think the 
response thus far has been to try to increase, over time, the extent to which we train judges 
and attorneys about implicit bias, about stereotype threat, about how these things can affect 
their decision making. There are some judges who have decided on their own accord to, 
for example, give anti-bias jury instructions, or who have made commitments to reminding 
themselves, or have taken pledges to not be biased. But again, that’s a matter of individual 
judges deciding how to run their courtrooms. 
It is much trickier to think about how to introduce these ideas as evidence in a case. 
Certainly, in the Trayvon Martin case, you have the attorneys wanting to introduce 
evidence of race and the role that that played, and the judge rejected that. So I think you 
have to try, but I'm not sure at this point what would be truly convincing for judges. And 
in part, that’s because the implicit bias evidence or the implicit bias information doesn't 
quite match up with our ideas of evidence and what constitutes evidence or what is deemed 
relevant evidence in a court case versus how we see it as being relevant maybe outside of 
that sphere. So I'm not sure that I have a good answer for you at this point.  
 
VOICE: Hi. I'm wondering if statistically, you've been able to take a look at regionality 
with the sentences. You mentioned the sentencing of black individuals versus white 
individuals, and I assume for the same crimes. But is there any difference between circuit 
courts and federal courts in the specific area and regional differences? 
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PROFESSOR PEERY: I'm not sure there has been research at the kind of level of the court. 
Even sentencing information of that variety can be hard to get. The studies that have been 
able to do that have gone through extensive work to pull a lot of records where you can 
actually get images of the individuals. After the fact, they're doing basically an archival 
analysis, paired with the kind of rating of these people's appearances. And that can be very 
hard to compile. Just like a lot of other data in the criminal justice system, it's not always 
very well kept. And it's also not something that people can always get access to. 
There has been quite a bit of research on the death penalty in federal sentencing and 
the effect of federal sentencing guidelines in particular. Which might suggest that that data 
is easier to get than the kind of lower state court or district court level—more at the 
appellate level or in capital cases, where there tends to be more of a record than exists in 
your run-of-the mill criminal case. 
 
VOICE: Do you think the weapon identification test and the shooter bias test would be 
useful in deciding whether to hire people as police officers? 
 
PROFESSOR PEERY: That’s been proposed. The pushback actually comes from 
researchers who have developed the tasks, who maintain that these are not individually 
diagnostic tools. The research, even after multiple decades, has not advanced to the point 
where we feel comfortable saying that any of these tools should be used to make some kind 
of individually diagnostic determination. 
Now, that's not to say it's not going to happen. I think the concern would be that it 
might actually disqualify too many people. So using that as a criterion for qualifying people 
to be police officers might be problematic. One of the reasons is if you're looking at it 
through the lens of, say, anti-black bias or pro-white bias, the default is for us as a society 
to have the pro-white/anti-black bias. There’s variation among different groups, but 
largely, it's skewed toward that, which means a lot of people will fail on that dimension. 
And I think that would be the concern about using the test in that way. 
 
VOICE: Hey. I am with First Defense Legal Aid. If you are a lawyer, you can actually take 
a six-hour shift with us. And what we do is we go directly to the police station when 
someone is arrested or detained. While we're trying to work on changing judges' minds or 
police officers’ minds, we can also be working on upholding civil rights and making sure 
those biases don't even make it to the courtroom by having a lawyer at the station. You can 
come and leave your name. And like I said—I will tell you more about it—you could get 
a six-hour shift once a month and go directly to the station. If you are just an organizer or 
a nonlegal worker, we also do Know Your Rights workshops. And I have cards that I also 
can hand out. So you can see me after the break. 
 
PROFESSOR PEERY: That highlights an important point: in terms of thinking about how 
you increase accountability and transparency, it's not just about the individual, it's about 
the system. Going after individual bias is really hard, particularly when you're talking about 
implicit bias. What’s more likely to be influential is systemic change: changing processes, 
changing policies and procedures, to inoculate against bias. It's not a problem to try to go 
after bias directly. But a lot of times, that's not very effective. A lot of diversity training, et 
cetera, is not very effective. There are instances where it's more harmful than it is helpful. 
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Whereas changing policies and procedures to create systemic effects can undo some of 
individual bias. 
 
VOICE: I do juvenile records expungement. I often see cases where children are charged 
as adults. And it seems to me there was a study about the perception that African-American 
children were older or more responsible than they actually were. And I'm just wondering 
if we can incorporate that. I don't remember the study.   
 
PROFESSOR PEERY: Yes. So there have been a couple of studies at this point showing 
that the implicit bias people have regarding black people attaches even to children. Even 
though we might think it applies predominantly to men or adults, we also see evidence that 
it applies to children. So the stereotype or the bias that black people are violent or criminal 
or aggressive attaches to children. 
And when it does, it means that we perceive those children as being older than they 
are. On average, black children are perceived to be four years older than their actual age. 
And with that comes greater acceptance that they are morally responsible, that they have 
more individual liability and responsibility for their actions. They're not granted the same 
things we grant other youth: impulsiveness or the stupidity of being young. Going out and 
doing dumb things because you feel peer pressure and whatnot. We skip over that and 
assume that they’re more adult than actually they are, that they’re more developed 
cognitively, morally, emotionally, et cetera. Which makes it okay in our minds to punish 
them more harshly—or at least in the system's mind. Because, you know, the criminal legal 
system is built on the idea that we want to punish people who are more morally responsible 
or more culpable in some way. So that is a finding that is out there. 
I will be around, so if you have other questions, certainly let me know. 
 
